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JOINT ADVENTURE

THE DOCTRINE OF JOINT ADVENTURE IN
AUTOMOBILE LAW

W

HILE there are, of course, many unusual and interesting questions relating to the law of automobiles and automobile actions,
we all know that the majority of these cases are simply questions of facts.
In the ordinary cases principles of law applicable to these facts are well
understood, and yet occasionally we encounter a situation the solution
of which under former presumably well-settled principles of negligence
is not easy. It has been to meet these new and unusual situations
which have resulted from the extensive use of automobiles that principles of law hitherto little known or little recognized have developed
rapidly, and likewise entirely new principles of law and new doctrines
and announcements have taken their place in the body of case law
to meet situations and questions which have until recently not been
presented.
A most interesting and important proposition of automobile law
which has apparently not yet reached its natural growth and conclusion
is the doctrine of Joint Adventure.
This doctrine is of comparatively recent announcement in the courts
of this state. Its close and very important relation to automobile liability insurance I will touch upon later. The doctrine in its essence
as it has been announced by our Supreme Court simply means that
where two persons are engaged in a joint enterprise and adventure in
the use of an automobile, the negligence of one is imputable to the
other, with the result that one occupant may not recover from a
driver or owner and with the further result that in an action against
a stranger to the enterprise by an occupant, the negligence of his driver
is imputable to him.
It should be borne in mind at the outset that the principle of joint
adventure, though closely related to, is entirely separate, distinct and
apart from the doctrine of contributory negligence of the occupant,
and the principle of imputed negligence based on the doctrine of Respondeat Superior
The doctrine of joint adventure or common enterprise has no fundamental relation either to the contributory negligence of the occupant
or the fact of his control over the driver. The joint enterprise having been established, the negligence of the driver becomes imputable to
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the occupant, regardless of the occupant's contributory negligence and
regardless of the occupant's actual control over the driver.
The difficult question relating to joint adventure is as to what constitutes a joint adventure; for it may be safely said that the legal result
of such a joint adventure has been clearly announced.
The question has been passed upon by the Supreme Court of this
state in three cases: Masterson v. Leonard,1 Hurley v. Spokane,'
Jensen v. Chicago, Mil. & St. P R. R. Co.'
Taking these cases up briefly in order- In the Masterson case it
appeared that the plaintiff was a minor; that his father owned a bicycle
which the plaintiff had been riding for about a year; that Edward
Buck, another boy of about the same age, twelve years, had a paper
route, and that at the time of the accident in question Edward Buck
was riding and propelling the bicycle and the plaintiff was riding
on the handle bars. Edward Buck was taking the plaintiff along in
order to acquaint the plaintiff with the route so that the plaintiff
could substitute if Edward Buck should become sick. Substantially
this was all the testimony with relation to the purpose of the ride.
The bicycle was struck by the defendant's automobile and the plaintiff
was injured. It was assumed by the trial court in its instructions that
Buck's negligence was imputable to the plaintiff. These instructions
were questioned on appeal and the Supreme Court, holding that the
boys were engaged in a joint enterprise or adventure, cited with approval the cases of Washington, etc. R. R. Co. v. Zell's' Administrator
(hereafter referred to as "The Zell-Peck case) 4 and Derrick v. Rail-

road
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In Hurley v. Spokane, supra, the appellant and her brother, who
was driving, were occupying their father's car with the father's permission, on their way to church. Apparently on these facts alone the
court held that they were engaged in a common venture, that it was
immaterial who was driving the car and that the negligence of the
brother was imputable to the sister.
In the Jensen case, supra, decided February 27, 1925, it appeared
that the plaintiff's intestate (Jensen), in company with several others,
left Hoquiam in an automobile belonging to one Sonnabend, for the
'116 Wash. 551, -00 Pac. 320 (1901).

126 Wash. 213, 217 Pac. 1004 (1923).
'33 Wash. Decisions 115, 233 Pac. 635 (1925).
'118 Va. 755, 88 S. E. 309 (1916).
,a50 Utah 573, 168 Pac. 335 (1917).
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purpose of attending a prize fight in Seattle. "The trip had been
talked over among the parties for a number of days. They were to
drive through to Seattle, attend the fight and return to Hoquiam.
Jensen gave Sonnabend a ticket. The members of the party, aside
from Sonnabend' and one other had discussed among themselves before
starting, the matter of expense and they had agreed that Sonnabend
should not be out anything." It did not appear that this information
had been conveyed to Sonnabend. They arrived in Seattle at about six
o'clock, had dinner, attended the fight and started for home. At Sumner, while crossing the tracks of the defendant railroad company the
automobile was struck by a train. and Jensen was killed. On these
facts it was held that the trial court properly submitted the question of
joint adventure to the jury and the court again cites and approves the
Zell-Peck case and in addition thereto the cases of Wentworth v. Town
of Waterbury (hereafter referred to as "The Lake Champlain case"),'
and Adams v. Swift. 6
It will be noted that in the facts of both the Masterson case and
the Jensen case there is found an element of financial contribution or
profit. These decisions themselves, therefore, are hardly direct authority for the proposition that a common venture may exist without
this element. However, this element is lacking in the Hurley case,
but the facts appearing in the opinion there are so few and the discussion of the proposition so very brief that the effect of the decision
is problematical.
More important, however, to the probable development of the doctrine in the State of Washington is the approval which the court has
twice given to the Zell-Peck case from Virginia and its approval in
the Jensen case of the Lake Champlain case from Vermont. These
two cases undoubtedly represent the most advanced positions which
the courts have taken in this country in relation to this doctrine and
in the light of the approval of our own court of these two cases it
seems altogether likely that the doctrine will ultimately go further in
this state, to the conclusion as reached in those cases.

In the Zell-Peck case it appeared that Zell and Peck, both residents
of Alexandria, were intimate friends and associates, Peck owning an
automobile, in which he and Zell frequently went out together on
pleasure trips. Both were familiar with the machine and were com'90 Vt. 60, 96 AtI. 334 (1916).
'172 Mass. 521, 52 N. E. 1068 (1899).
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petent drivers. When out together they would sometimes take turn
about at the wheel. Zell frequently drove the car when Peck was
along and seems to have been the man who always got it out and ready
for a trip. It was not unusual for them to go to Washington together
on Sunday and they were on such a trip when they met their death
in a collision with the train. It was assumed that Peck was driving
at the time of the accident, though there was no definite testimony to
this effect. The court, nevertheless, denied a recovery to Zell's administratrix on the ground that they were engaged in a joint enterprise,
holding that "where two persons are engaged in a joint enterprise or
adventure, even though the enterprise or adventure be only a pleasure
trip, all contributory negligence of either, within the scope of the enterprise, will bar a recovery by the other."
As indicated above, this case has been cited and approved twice by
our Supreme Court.
In the Lake Champlain case it appeared that the plaintiff, his wife
and a young woman, went riding in an automobile driven by one
Gibson, the automobile being owned by Gibson's father. They started
from Fayston on a Sunday afternoon and went to Burlington for a
ride for the purpose of showing Lake Champlain to the two women oc
cupants of the car. They drove to the waterfront, drove around for a
short time and then started back over the road they had gone over
and on the return trip the accident occurred which was claimed to
have been due to the negligence of the defendant town because of the
insufficiency of a culvert. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff,
and on appeal from the Supreme Court of Vermont, judgment was reversed and the case ordered dismissed, on the ground that the driver
was guilty of contributory negligence and that such negligence was
imputable to the plaintiff. The court held that plaintiff and Gibson
were engaged in the joint purpose of taking the two ladies for an
afternoon's ride and they being engaged in such a common enterprise
the negligence of one was imputable to the other.
It will be noted that in neither of these cases was there any element
of profit whatsoever or of financial contribution, but the court in each
of the cases referred to announces the broad doctrine that regardless of
the element of profit or contribution, where two or more persons are
using the automobile for a joint purpose, even though that purpose be
one of pleasure, the result legally is one of a joint adventure, and as
indicated above the full approval which has been given these cases in
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our own court impels the conclusion that these decisions probably represent the ultimate development of the doctrine in this state.
It is manifest that it is becoming a difficult task indeed to determine
in a given case whether the relatioti is that of guest and host or -represents a joint adventure. That the line of demarcation between these
two classes of cases has been considerably dimmed cannot well be
doubted and yet the wisdom and justice of the development of this
doctrine is very apparent. Practically it is almost impossible to show
actual contributory negligence of the occupant of a car. That an occupant must do something more than simply "sit tight" is now established. An occupant may be guilty of contributory negligence by riding with a drunken driver; by failing to protest or complain against
apparently excessive speed, he may be guilty of negligence in many
other ways, but as a practical proposition, proof of such negligence,
though it undoubtedly often exists, is difficult, if not impossible.
And yet we also know as a matter of fact that in spite of the difficulty of such proof, occupants of cars, even on pleasure rides, do and
may control to a great extent the operation of the vehicle. That is,
the occupant may exercise that control if he sees fit to do it and after
it has been judicially declared that an automobile in a sense is a "dangerous instrumentality" there seems to be no good reason why a prospective occupant, even on a pleasure ride, should not be required to
exercise some caution as to the selection of his driver and there likewise appears to be no good reason why such an occupant should not
be compelled to claim through his driver, whom he has the absolute
privilege to accept or reject before the ride.
So much for joint adventure. It must be realized that the doctrine
in this state is just developing and its ultimate conclusion, while apparently headed in a definite direction is not yet finally determined. Text
writers are not agreed on the wisdom of the rule or its justice, and
there is a straight conflict in other jurisdictions. There can be no
question but that it has developed as a result of the refusal of the
courts to permit manifest injustice.
An extra-judicial result of this doctrine is its relation to liability
insurance. It is becoming a common matter to be called upon to defend suits by children against parents and parents against children,
brothers against sisters and vice versa, where the defendant carries
liability insurance. Those familiar with these suits fully understand
that they never would have been waged had it not been that the de-
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fendant was insured, "friendly suits" as it were, with the "friends"
pitted against the insurance company Collusive, nearly all of them,
they are not far removed from conspiracies to defraud. The great
majority of them arise when all are passengers in the same car. An
upset or overturned car, a collision with a telephone pole, or even with
another machine, immediately suggests the remunerative but collusive
suit. Collusion, if it exists, will defeat the policy, but if an insurance
company has ever been able to prove this collusion, that case is not
in the books. It is needless to add that the doctrine of joint adventure
applied rigorously but fairly and impartially, has tended to prevent
this sort of injustice.
Judson F Falknor
SEATTLE, 'WASHiNGTON.

